2013年4月26日，大法官針對都市更新條例關於都市更新事業概要及計畫之審核程序，作出第709號解釋，另定新的「正當行政程序」違憲審查標準。[1] 釋憲者新立違憲審查標準時，有升高的闡明義務。[2] 人民對於大法官提出之意見書內的闡明是否有所本，自然也有更高的期待。
709號解釋新訂之「正當行政程序」，建立在我國憲法保障之「正當法律程序」的基礎上。[3] 唯大法官與憲法學者咸認我國和其他大陸法系國家一樣，憲法並無正當法律程序的明文規定，[4] 而是繼受自英國的《大憲章》和美國移植自英國《大憲章》的憲法規定，英國稱之為「自然正義」，[5] 包括「不偏頗的法庭」和「保障聽證程序」，其基本概念是「任何人不能自審自判」和「提供被指控者辯解的機會」，
[6] 目的是要確保訴訟程序的公平，進而確保最終的審判公平。[7] 行政機+關的「行政處分」，是國會委任行政機關行使「司法權」，是為「委任司法」，[8] 稱作「準司法權」，[9] 亦受到正當法律程序的拘束，始能確保行政處分的公平。[10]
[6] 目的是要確保訴訟程序的公平，進而確保最終的審判公平。[7] 行政機+關的「行政處分」，是國會委任行政機關行使「司法權」，是為「委任司法」，[8] 稱作「準司法權」，[9] 亦受到正當法律程序的拘束，始能確保行政處分的公平。[10]
由於我國憲法並無正當法律程序的規定，對於正當法律程序相關之解釋，釋憲者之闡明應以英美文獻為本，緃使因文化、國情或其他現實因素，認為無法完全繼受英美之正當法律程序而必須有所調整，亦應於正確闡明其法理後為之。[11] 然羅大法官在709號解釋意見書中，援引三份美國文獻，主張「就『程序上正當程序』而言，另有『司法之正當程序』（judicial due process）、『立法之正當程序』（legislative
due process）、與『行政之正當程序』（administrative due
process）之說」，[12] 與美國聯邦最高法院的判決先例不符，茲分述如下。
一、通知與辯解機會的正當法律程序
羅大法官在意見書中主張的「司法之正當程序」，與美國聯邦最高法院判決先例不符。美國憲法保障之正當法律程序的目的，如前所述，是要保障訴訟程序的公平。[13] 根據美國聯邦最高法院的判例，自1864年以來，美國正當法律程序經過一個多世紀的發展，實質意義非常清楚，就是權利受到限制或剝奪者享有辯解的機會(聽審或聽證)，為享有辯解的機會，一定要先被通知，通知與辯解的時機與方式必須具有實質的意義。[14]
羅大法官在意見書中主張：「『司法之正當程序』，指法院審判前，必須先有已經制定的程序規則以供適用；且此等規則必須公正公平。」[15] 源自1994年出版的「新聞自由v. 公平審判－自1807年聯邦最高法院的判決」，[16] 法律見解與聯邦最高法院的判例並不相符。
羅大法官參考之該份文獻的作者是Douglas S. Campbell，曾任美國賓州洛海芬州立大學英國文學、新聞和哲學系系主任，該書的讀者群是無法律背景之新聞系學生與新聞從業人員，探討的議題是新聞自由對陪審團的影響，書中提供30個聯邦最高法院判例的事件背景、簡化的判決書內容及判決分析。羅大法官參照的部分出現在緒論中，未標示任何文獻出處，無從查驗法律見解的真偽和可信性。
羅大法官是釋憲者，國家憲法的守門人，提出解釋憲法的意見書，參照美國文獻為闡明時，不參照美國負責釋憲之聯邦最高法院的第一手資料，反而屈就作者是法律以外科系的大學教授、寫給非法律專業之新聞系學生與新聞從業人員的第二手資料，且法律見解與聯邦最高法院的判決先例不符，羅大法官的意見書要取信於民，必須有所說明、解釋以及必要的澄清、更正。
二、美國憲法未提供立法之正當程序保障
羅大法官主張「程序上正當程序」包括「立法之正當程序」，也與證據不符。
根據美國聯邦最高法院1915年的判例，正當法律程序並不適用於立法程序。[17] 行政機關制定「法規命令」是「委任立法」，因此也不在憲法正當法律程序的保障範圍之內。[18] 美國聯邦政府制定法規命令時必須遵行的「通知」與「陳述」程序，是美國1946年制定之行政程序法提供的人權保障，美國的行政程序法因此被視為新的「人權法案」，[19] 具備「準憲法」的地位。[20] 我國《行政程序法》第四章繼受自美國行政程序法，有十分類似的規定。[21]
羅大法官認為「『立法之正當程序』指的是國會必須遵循憲法及法定之程序以制定法律；如有違反，釋憲機關得予宣告無效。」[22] 參照的文獻是2008年出版、加州柏克萊商學系教授Michael
Conant著的「憲法和經濟法規：客觀理論與評論」第211頁，羅大法官意見書中的中文翻譯與法律見解，與參照之原文的真意並不相符。
Conant在第211頁的第一段中，指出正當法律程序拘束三個政府部門：[23] (1)司法機關辦理民事或刑事訴訟，必須遵循先聽審、再裁決的司法程序；[24] (2)立法機關的國會及州議會，「制定法律必須遵守憲法及法定之程序，最高法院有權廢止任何拒絕提供規定程序的法律」[25]；和(3)行政機關執行法律時，必須提供與相關行政功能相符之完整且公平的聽證程序。[26]
Conant在第211頁的第二段中，引述美國聯邦最高法院1855年的判例指出：「正當法律程序對立法機關的限制，無異於對司法與行政機關的限制，立法機關無權根據立法意志制定正當法律程序的法律。」[27] 至於立法機關制定之「法律」必須遵守之憲法及法定的程序為何？Conant引用同一判例主張有三類：(1)美國憲法及憲法增修第四、五、六、八條規定的特定程序，[28] 例如搜索、扣押、拘提、陪審團制、不自證己罪、對質、律師協助辯護.....等 (2)當時已經存在之英國普通法與國會制定之成文法規定的程序；[29] 和(3)未來由立法機關的國會和州議會制定、符合公平原則的法律。[30]
按照Conant的原文，正當法律程序禁止立法機關制定不符合正當法律程序的「法律」，羅大法官的中譯與原文的真意不符，主張立法機關在制定法律時的「程序」，必須遵循憲法及法定之程序，如有違反，釋憲機關得予宣告無效，[31] 這樣的法律見解不但與美國聯邦最高法院的判例不符，甚至與參考的文獻不符。
再者，羅大法官為釋憲者，憲法的守門人，但是在解釋憲法時，不只一次捨第一手資料的美國聯邦最高法院判例，屈就學者著作的第二手資料，很難說服人民，更何況
Conant在該書的前言中，明確指出該書是使用基本經濟分析嚴詞評論憲法中與經濟相關條款的原意與詮釋，許多的結論與聯邦最高法院及早期評論者明顯不同，[32] 只是Conant個人的法律見解，絲毫不具法律上的拘束力和強制力。
三、參考學生論文的行政之正當程序
羅大法官在意見書中主張「『行政之正當程序』則係指行政機關所應遵守之『程序上正當程序』。」[33] 未根據美國聯邦最高法院的判例，分辨行政機關「行政處分」與「法規命令」兩種截然不同的行政行為，針對不同的行政行為指出憲法應提供的正當法律程序保障，以致提出之法律見解與證據不符。
羅大法官有關「行政之正當程序」的法律主張，參照的美國文獻是1981年美國University of California Hastings College
of the Law法學院三年級學生Marilyn J. Friedman 32年前的舊作，標題是「證據開示和行政正當法律程序：被控者之證據開示權和行政效率的平衡」，探討的議題是加州政府懲戒領有證照之專業人士時，是否應提供「證據開示權」，確保行政處分的公平，[34] 與709號解釋的都更程序，欠缺邏輯上的關聯性和法律上的關聯性。
羅大法官是釋憲者，國家憲法的守門人，但是解釋憲法時，完全未參考美國聯邦最高法院的判例，反而降格屈就美國法學院三年級學生32年前的舊作，且對709號解釋的都更程序而言，該論文並不切題，羅大法官對憲法的尊重、文獻的選用、解釋憲法與闡明的方式，均應提出解釋與說明，否則很難讓人民釋懷。
法律是科學，追求真理與真相。司法是國家的重大說服工程，大法官在解釋憲法時，闡明必須有所本，始能證明無誤，取信於民。然羅昌發大法官的709號解釋意見書，關於美國「程序上正當程序」的法律見解，包括「司法之正當程序」、「立法之正當程序」和「行政之正當程序」，均與美國聯邦最高法院之判決先例不符，無法證明無誤，也無法取信於民，為善盡釋憲者之闡明義務，必須有所解釋、說明和澄清，並做出必要的更正。
[1] 709號解釋文:「都市更新條例第十條第一項...
同條第二項...第十九條第三項前段...不符憲法要求之正當行政程序.....」；蘇永欽709號解釋意見書：「基本權的保障本應與時俱進，在行政程序法制定之後，再從憲法角度繼續提升正當行政程序的要求，並無不可...任何違憲審查標準的突破...本件解釋對於新標準的建立...」。
[2] 林錫堯709號解釋意見書：「『憲法要求之正當行政程序』係出於『憲法上正當法律程序原則』？抑或係出於『各個基本權之客觀規範效力』？進而要問；『憲法上正當法律程序原則』如何而來？『憲法上正當法律程序原則之內涵』是否包括『正當行政程序』？除『由立法者制定相應之法定程序』外，尚有無基本要求？如依上述理路，能否導出『憲法要求之正當行政程序之內涵』？上開問題，仍有待釐清並建構理論。」蘇永欽709號解釋意見書：「基本權的保障本應與時俱進，在行政程序法制定之後， 再從憲法角度繼續提升正當行政程序的要求，並無不可。重要的是，任何違憲審查標準的突破，釋憲者都有升高的闡明義務。」。
[3] 709號解釋理由書：「 憲法上正當法律程序原則之內涵，應視所涉基本權之種類、限制之強度及範圍、所欲追求之公共利益、決定機關之功能合適性、有無替代程序或各項可能程序之成本等因素綜合考量，由立法者制定相應之法定程序（本院釋字第六八九號解釋參照）」；李震山709號解釋意見書：「本件解釋選擇憲法『正當法律程序』原則作為規範審查的主要依據，宣告舊都市更新條例第十條及第十九條第三項前段規定違憲...。」；葉百修709號解釋意見書：「本件解釋涉及憲法上正當法律程序原則許多重要概念以及規範內容，特別是適用於都市更新事件上，固然是近日臺灣社會備受重視的重要議題。」。
[4] 蘇永欽709號解釋意見書：「我國憲法未如美國憲法直接宣示正當法律程序的一般原則」；葉俊榮，環境正當法律程序，台大法學叢書，1993年，頁53：「在許多大陸法系國家的憲法裡，並沒有類似美國憲法上的這種正當法律程序的規定，我國憲法亦然」；翁岳生，大法官有關保障人身自由之解釋大法官關於人身自由保障的解釋，警察大學法學論集，創刊號，1996，頁8：「基本上，憲法第八條完全是英美法的產物，該條所稱「依法定程序」與英美法之「正當法律程序」原則相同，現在大陸法也接受這樣的理念，相關的國際人權公約也都有這樣的規範。」；林子儀，人身自由與檢察官之羈押權，刊於「人身自由與強制處分權之探討」研討會論文，憲政時代第21卷第2 期，1995，頁22：「『正當之法律程序』（due process of law）最早為美國憲法明文所規定。民主憲政國家的憲法雖然無類如美國憲法的明文規定，但均經由司法實務或學說理論以解釋方式，將該原則納入其國憲法的體系之中。」 。
[5] 林子儀，人身自由與檢察官之羈押權，刊於「人身自由與強制處分權之探討」研討會論文，憲政時代第21卷第2 期，1995，頁23：「英國雖無正當之法律程序一詞，在具體個案中，則是使用「自然正義」（natural
justice）一詞，表示正當之法律程序的相同理念。而自然正義也正是正當之法律程序的原始意義。」；孫森焱384號解釋意見書：「本件解釋文提及所謂『法定程序』必須『實質正當』，此概念的形成，可溯源於英國大憲章，然後移植美國。查美國憲法修正第五條及修正第十四條規定非經正當法定程序不得剝奪任何人之生命、自由或財產。」；孫森焱418號解釋意見書：「所謂『正當法律程序』原則的形成可溯源於英國大憲章，然後移植美國。美國憲法修正第五及第十四條分別規定非經正當法定程序不得剝奪任何人之生命、自由或財產。」；湯德宗709號解釋意見書註25：「除（憲法第八條）「人身自由」之剝奪，須依『法定程序』，而有憲法上『正當程序』之保障外，以後大法官並陸續釋示：國家限制人民之『訴訟權』（釋字第三九六號、第四一八號、第四四六號、第五七四號、第五八二號、第六五四號等解釋參見）、『財產權』（釋字第四０九號、第四八八號等解釋參見）、『工作權』（釋字第四六二號解釋參見）、『服公職權』（釋字第四九一號、第
七０四號等解釋參見），亦須踐行相應之正當程序。大體而言，我國憲法上『正當程序保障』之適用範圍已與美國憲法增修條文第五條（及第十四條） 相當--非經正當法律程序，不得剝奪人民之『生命、自由或財產』。此一發展過程，並參見湯德宗，〈論憲法上的正當程序保障〉，前揭書（註
22），頁167以下。」。
[6] Charles
H. Koch, Jr. "Some Kind of Hearing" in
England, 23 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 219, 220 (1981) (“Natural justice is based on two
fundamental concepts. The first is a guarantee of an unbiased tribunal. This
doctrine stems from the idea that no one should be a judge in his own case. The
second precept of natural justice is a guarantee of some kind of hearing, which
arises from the right to present the other side.”) citing Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (H.L. 1852); Ridge
v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 66 (H.L.) and 26 MOD. L. REV. 543, 544 (1963).
[7] Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct.
2252 (U.S. 2009) (“It is axiomatic
that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.’”). 我國憲法第16條保障訴訟權，大法官已先後根據美國憲法正當法律程序之規定，做出396、418、446、574、582和654號解釋，確認正當法律程序之保障涵蓋在憲法第16條的訴訟權之內，保障訴訟程序的公平。
[8]
Fed. Mar. Com'n
v. S. Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S.743,773 (U.S. 2002) (Breyer J., dissenting) (“The
Court long ago laid to rest any constitutional doubts about whether the
Constitution permitted Congress to delegate rulemaking
and adjudicative powers to agencies. E. g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. &
T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 494-495 (1897) (permitting rulemaking); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46 (1932) (permitting adjudication)”).
[9] Fed.
Mar. Com’n.
at 774 (“This constitutional understanding explains why both
commentators and courts have often attached the prefix "quasi" to
descriptions of an agency's rulemaking or adjudicative functions.”).
[10]
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, (U.S.1976) (“These
decisions underscore the truism that "‘[d]ue process,' unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances." "[D]ue
process is flexible, and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." Accordingly,
resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are
constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”); 沈開舉，委任司法初探－從行政機關解決糾紛行為的性質談起，鄭州大學學報，2007年第1期：「無論是行政立法還是行政司法，雖然都是由行政機關來行使權力，但並未改變立法權和司法權的性質，所不同的只是這些權力在不同的機關轉移而己。其實，立法權、司法權由哪些機關行使並不重要，重要的是不管哪個機關行使立法權、司法權，都必須尊重該權力的特性和遵循該權力行使的原則和規律。」。
[13] Library
of Congress, CRS Annotated Constitution, 2002 (“The content of the CRS Annotated Constitution was prepared by
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) at the Library
of Congress, and published electronically in plaintext and PDF by the Government
Printing Office. Dating back to 1964, the initial online annotations were
published in 1992, and supplements were released in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000”); Peter Strauss, Due Process, Legal Information
Institute, Cornell University Law School,
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process
(“ In that sense, the two
clauses are not the same thing, but insofar as they do impose such implicit
requirements of fair trials, fair hearings, and the like, which exist
separately from, though they are informed with, express constitutional
guarantees, the interpretation of the two clauses is substantially if not
wholly the same.”).
[14] Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223,
233 (U.S. 1864) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common
justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without notice and an opportunity to make his defence.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507,
533 (U.S.2004) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due
process has been clear: `Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled
to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified.' It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard `must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”).
[16] Douglas S.
Campbell, Free Press v. Fair Trial – Supreme Court Decisions since 1807, at 4
(1994) (“Judicial due process means, first, that
the courts must establish rules before they apply them and, second, that
these rules must be fair.”).
[17] Bi-metallic
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (U.S. 1915) ("Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a
few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting
or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed
that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of
ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in
the only way that they can be in a complex society -- by their power, immediate
or remote, over those who make the rule. If the result in this case had been
reached, as it might have been, by the state's doubling the rate of taxation,
no one would suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated unless every
person affected had been allowed an opportunity to raise his voice against it
before the body entrusted by the state constitution with the power.”); CRS Annotated Constitution 在程序正當法律程序的部分，完全未論及立法的正當法律程序；Peter Strauss, Due
Process, Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School (“[T]he Constitution does not require “due process” for
establishing laws; the provision applies when the state acts against
individuals “in each case upon individual grounds” - when some characteristic unique to the citizen is involved. Of course
there may be a lot of citizens affected; the issue is whether assessing the
effect depends “in each case upon individual grounds.” Thus, the due process
clause doesn't govern how Ohio sets the rules for student discipline in its
high schools; but it does govern how Ohio applies those rules to individual
students who are thought to have violated them - even if in some cases (say, cheating on a state-wide examination) a
large number of students were allegedly involved.”).
[19]
Joshua K. Westmoreland, Global Warming and Originalism:
The Role of the EPA in the Obama Administration, 37 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.
225, 243 (2010) (“Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946, designing it to function as the bill of rights for the new regulatory state.”).
[20] Michael
Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on
California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 Tulsa L.J.
297, 297 (1986) (“[T]he APA prescribes the manner
in which countless thousands of federal adjudicatory and rulemaking proceedings
are conducted each year. In that sense, the APA has achieved quasi-constitutional
status.”).
[21] 行政程序法第152條：「法規命令之訂定，除由行政機關自行草擬者外，並得由人民或團體提議為之。前項提議，應以書面敘明法規命令訂定之目的、依據及理由，並附具相關資料。」；第154條：「行政機關擬訂法規命令時，除情況急迫，顯然無法事先公告周知者外，應於政府公報或新聞紙公告，載明下列事項︰一、訂定機關之名稱，其依法應由數機關會同訂定者，各該機關名稱。二、訂定之依據。三、草案全文或其主要內容。四、任何人得於所定期間內向指定機關陳述意見之意旨。行政機關除為前項之公告外，並得以適當之方法，將公告內容廣泛周知。」； 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)-(c) (“(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include—(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply—(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. (c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.”).
[23] Michael
Conant, The Constitution and Economic Regulation: Objective Theory and Critical Commentary,
at 211 (2008) (“The constitutional context indicates that the constraint is
imposed on all three departments of government.”).
[24] Id. (“The constitutional context
indicates that the constraint is imposed on all three departments of
government. In a criminal prosecution, a convicted defendant may be deprived of
his life, liberty, or property. In a civil lawsuit, a losing defendant may be
deprived of his property. In either case, there is a required judicial
procedure. Daniel Webster explained it as “a law which hears before it
condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry and render judgment only after trial.”).
[25] Id.
(“Legislative due
process would require the Congress and state assemblies to follow all their
respective constitutional and statutory procedures for enacting laws. The
Supreme Court will void any statute that denies required procedures.”).
[26] Id. (“And, under due process,
executive officers must administer laws in ways which give citizens such full
and fair hearings as are appropriate to the particular administrative
functions.”).
[27] Id. quoting Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 59
U.S. 272, 276 (U.S. 1856) (“It is manifest
that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might
be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative, as well as on the
executive and judicial, powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as
to leave Congress free to make any process "due process of law," by
its mere will.”).
[28] Michael
Conant, The Constitution and Economic Regulation: Objective Theory and Critical Commentary,
at 211 (2008) (“The first category enumerated by Justice Curtis includes the
various specific “process” or procedural guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth amendments and those in the original constitution.”).
[29] Id., at 211 (2008)
(“His second category notes the constitutional incorporation of the then
existing procedural guarantees under the common and statute law of England ”).
[30] Id., at 212 (2008)
(“But there must be a third category of due process. The framers of the Fifth
Amendment clearly contemplated that the Congress would pass new procedure
statutes. And the Congress, in framing the Fourteenth Amendment, contemplated
that the state legislatives will pass new procedure statutes....While
conforming to the specific process guarantees of Amendments Five to Eight, any
of the innovative procedures of later legislatures or administrators might have
an essential unfairness or inequity to the people governed. Hence,…there must
have been a third, general limitation on all procedures of all departments of
government. They must be fair and equitable under the general value standards
of American society.”).
[31] 羅昌發709號解釋意見書頁16-17；381號解釋解釋文：「憲法第一百七十四條第一款關於憲法之修改，由國民大會代表總額三分之二之出席及出席代表四分之三之決議之規定，係指國民大會通過憲法修改案時，必須之出席及贊成之人數。至於憲法修改案應經何種讀會暨各次讀會之出席及議決人數，憲法及法律皆未規定。修改憲法所進行之一讀會程序，並非通過憲法修改案，其開議出席人數究採國民大會組織法第八條代表總額三分之一，或採憲法第一百七十四條第一款所定三分之二之出席人數，抑或參照一般會議規範所定出席人數為之，係屬議會自律之事項，均與憲法無違。至自律事項之決定，應符合自由民主憲政秩序之原則，乃屬當然，併此指明。」；499號解釋解釋文：「憲法為國家根本大法，其修改關係憲政秩序之安定及全國國民之福祉至鉅，應由修憲機關循正當修憲程序為之。又修改憲法乃最直接體現國民主權之行為，應公開透明為之，以滿足理性溝通之條件，方能賦予憲政國家之正當性基礎。」；林子儀、葉俊榮、黃昭元、張文貞，憲法-權力分立，林子儀、葉俊榮、黃昭元、張文貞，「憲法—權利分立」，2003，頁376-377：「正當法律程序的適用對象固然是所有可能侵犯人民權利的國家權力，包括立法、行政、司法程序。但因為立法程序另有國會自律原則的適用，一般而言，立法程序並無正當法律程序的直接適用。」。
[32] Id.,
at xi (2008) (“This study utilizes basic
economics analysis as a technique to comment critically on the original
meanings and the interpretations of those clauses of the Constitution that have
particular bearings on economy. Many of the conclusions are markedly different
from those of the Supreme Court and earlier commentators.”).
[34] Marilyn J.
Friedman, Discovery and Administrative Due Process: A Balance Between an
Accused’s Right to Discovery and Administrative Efficiency, Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly, Vol.8: 645, 645 (1981) (“An attorney who must defend against the
revocation of his client’s license before a state agency is at a great
disadvantage in that the tools of discovery, which are readily available to a
civil litigant, are of limited use to an accused facing disciplinary
proceedings.”).
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